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NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
______________ 
 
No. 15-2315 
______________ 
 
MOURAD MADRANE, 
       Petitioner 
 
v. 
 
ATTORNEY GENERAL UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
______________ 
 
On Petition for Review from the Board of Immigration Appeals 
(B.I.A. No. A077-650-840) 
Immigration Judge: Hon. Walter A. Durling 
______________ 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a) 
March 23, 2016 
______________ 
                                                                
Before: GREENAWAY, JR., VANASKIE, and SHWARTZ, Circuit Judges. 
 
(Filed:    May 4, 2016) 
 
______________ 
 
OPINION* 
______________ 
 
SHWARTZ, Circuit Judge. 
 Mourad Madrane petitions for review of orders of the Board of Immigration 
Appeals (“BIA”) denying him withholding of removal, deferral of removal under the 
                                                 
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and, pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7, 
does not constitute binding precedent. 
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Convention Against Torture (“CAT”), and adjustment of status.  For the reasons that 
follow, we will deny the petition in part and dismiss it in part for lack of jurisdiction.   
I1 
Madrane is a native and citizen of Morocco who was admitted to the United States 
in 1997 as a non-immigrant visitor.  His visa expired on April 10, 1998.  In 1999, he 
married a U.S. citizen, who filed an I-130 petition for alien relative status on his behalf, 
which was approved.  Madrane also applied for adjustment of status.  Shortly afterwards, 
Madrane pled guilty in federal court for his role in a scheme to steal credit card 
information and make fraudulent purchases using counterfeit credit cards, in violation of 
18 U.S.C. § 1029(a)(2)-(4), (b)(2).   Madrane stole hundreds of credit card numbers from 
patrons of a restaurant where he worked as a waiter, which he then passed to his 
co-defendant to make counterfeit credit cards.  According to the Presentence 
Investigation Report (“PSR”), some of the stolen numbers were used to make more than 
$172,000 in purchases.  Madrane himself was paid “$100 or so per credit card,” and 
made purchases of up to $12,000 using counterfeit cards.  AR 1737.   
At sentencing, Madrane disputed the manner for calculating the intended loss from 
his theft for sentencing guideline purposes,2 but did not dispute the PSR’s calculation of 
                                                 
1 We only recount the procedural history relevant to this appeal.   
2 The intended loss took into account an estimated loss for credit card numbers 
that had not yet been fraudulently used.  The Government argued that a figure of $2,000 
per credit card was warranted and the defense argued that $500 per card was more 
appropriate.  The District Court chose to apply a $500 figure, as Madrane requested and 
the PSR recommended.   
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the actual losses suffered by the victims.  Because Madrane was responsible for procuring 
all of the card numbers, he was deemed responsible for the same amount of loss as his co-
defendant.  Madrane was sentenced to eighteen months in prison for each of four counts, 
to run concurrently, and ordered to pay $180,442.02 in restitution.  AR 2392, 2396.   
After Madrane completed his prison sentence, his application for adjustment of 
status was denied because of his criminal conviction, and removal proceedings were 
initiated.  Madrane requested withholding of removal and protection under the CAT, 
claiming that he fears harm from the Muslim Brotherhood because of his willingness to 
testify against his co-defendant, whose brother is a member of the Muslim Brotherhood, 
and his marriage to a Catholic woman.     
In 2004, the Immigration Judge (“IJ”) denied Madrane’s application, finding him 
ineligible for withholding of removal because he had committed a “particularly serious 
crime,” AR 2161, and concluding that he did not merit CAT protection because the 
Muslim Brotherhood was “a private organization in no way affiliated with the Moroccan 
government.”  AR 2164.  The BIA affirmed the IJ’s decision without opinion and denied 
a motion for reconsideration.  
In 2005, the Department of Homeland Security initiated new proceedings charging 
Madrane with removability for remaining in the United States longer than permitted 
under 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(1)(B), and for having been convicted of a crime involving 
moral turpitude under § 1227(a)(2)(A)(i) and an aggravated felony under 
§ 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii).  The IJ found Madrane removable for overstaying his visa and for 
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committing a crime of moral turpitude, but not for an aggravated felony.  The IJ applied 
the modified categorical approach, noted that the indictment did not allege losses of over 
$10,000, and found that the $10,000 loss requirement for a fraud offense to qualify as an 
aggravated felony was not met.   
In July 2006, Madrane applied for a waiver of inadmissibility under § 212(h) of 
the Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”), and for adjustment of status.  See 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1182(h) (also referred to as INA § 212(h)).  The IJ granted the § 212(h) waiver due to 
the hardship Madrane’s wife would suffer should he be deported.  The BIA disagreed and 
held that it could not “conclude either that [Madrane] ha[d] shown genuine rehabilitation 
or that it would be in the best interest of this nation to grant him relief,” and he therefore 
did not merit a discretionary 212(h) waiver.3  AR 1013.  The BIA nonetheless remanded 
to the IJ to allow Madrane to apply for withholding of removal.   
On remand, Madrane requested withholding of removal and CAT protection due 
to fear of harm from both the Muslim Brotherhood and the Moroccan government, which 
he claimed could suspect him of association with the Muslim Brotherhood.  He submitted 
evidence that his father felt threatened by the Muslim Brotherhood and had been 
interrogated by police, and that his brother died after being beaten by someone who his 
family believed was a member of the Muslim Brotherhood.  The IJ reaffirmed his earlier 
finding that Madrane had failed to demonstrate eligibility for CAT relief.  The IJ found 
                                                 
3 Because the BIA made the discretionary determination that Madrane did not 
merit a waiver, it did not consider his statutory eligibility for such relief.   
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that the deaths of his brother and mother, which he implies occurred because of his 
brother’s passing, did not add substance to his claim, he showed no connection between 
the Muslim Brotherhood and the Moroccan government, and his fears that the 
government itself would torture him were too speculative.  The IJ also revisited 
Madrane’s conviction in light of Nijhawan v. Holder, 557 U.S. 29, 36 (2009), and 
concluded that Madrane was convicted of an aggravated felony, reasoning that the 
amount of loss from his fraud exceeded $10,000 based upon the amount of forfeiture that 
was ordered.  Finally, the IJ found that Madrane’s crime was properly characterized as 
“particularly serious,” barring him from eligibility for withholding of removal.  AR 410-
11.   
On appeal, the BIA confirmed that the IJ rightly revisited the question of whether 
Madrane’s conviction was for an aggravated felony due to the intervening legal authority 
on this point, but held that it was improper to consider the amount of forfeiture, which is 
“based on the offender’s gain rather than the victim’s loss.”  AR 305.  The BIA 
nonetheless upheld the IJ’s conclusion that Madrane had been convicted of an aggravated 
felony, since the sentencing court had ordered Madrane to pay $180,442.02 in restitution 
to compensate victims for their losses.  The BIA also upheld the IJ’s conclusion that the 
offense constituted a particularly serious crime “due to the large number of victims, his 
length of sentence, and the high amount of restitution ordered,” barring Madrane from 
withholding of removal.  AR 307.  However, the BIA remanded the CAT claim to ensure 
that the IJ considered whether the Moroccan government acquiesced in potential 
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mistreatment by the Muslim Brotherhood by displaying willful blindness to it.     
The IJ once again denied the CAT claim because Madrane’s fear of torture from 
the Muslim Brotherhood and the Moroccan government were speculative, and because he 
failed to present evidence that the government would acquiesce in any torture by the 
Muslim Brotherhood.  Madrane again appealed to the BIA, which held that Madrane had 
failed to meet his burden of establishing that he was more likely than not to be tortured 
because he did not provide evidence that connected the death of his brother and possible 
disappearance of his father4 to his willingness to cooperate with U.S. law enforcement, or 
demonstrate that the Muslim Brotherhood was responsible for, or the Moroccan 
government was involved in or knew of the circumstances of, his brother’s death.  
Similarly, the BIA found that statements from Madrane’s father that he was interrogated 
by police about his sons’ connections to terrorism or the Muslim Brotherhood did not 
establish that the Moroccan authorities were likely to suspect Madrane of being affiliated 
with the Muslim Brotherhood, or to torture him.  While the BIA acknowledged that 
country conditions evidence did demonstrate that Morocco has utilized torture and 
committed human rights abuses, it found that Madrane failed to present evidence that he 
would be “personally at risk” of such treatment.  AR 5.  The BIA said that Madrane’s 
evidence “almost exclusively relate[d] to his father and brother” and he did not establish 
how their experiences related to him, or “that each link in the hypothetical chain of events 
                                                 
4 Madrane submitted additional materials to the IJ, including a new statement that 
he had not heard from his father since 2011 and feared that something bad had happened 
to him.  
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leading to the torture he fears is more likely than not to occur.”  AR 5.  Madrane petitions 
for review. 
II5 
A 
Madrane argues that the BIA wrongfully considered him ineligible for withholding 
of removal because it incorrectly held that he committed a particularly serious crime.  
Withholding of removal does not confer upon an alien the right to remain in the United 
States indefinitely, but grants the temporary right not to be deported to a particular 
country in which “there is a ‘clear probability that the alien’s life or freedom would be 
threatened upon [his or] her removal.’”  Garcia v. Att’y Gen., 665 F.3d 496, 505 (3d Cir. 
2011) (quoting Chen v. Gonzales, 434 F.3d 212, 216 (3d Cir. 2005)).  However, 
withholding of removal is not available to aliens that the Attorney General determines 
have been convicted of a “particularly serious crime,” making them “a danger to the 
community” of the United States.  8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3)(B)(ii); 8 C.F.R. § 1208.16(d)(2).  
In this Circuit, an offense must be an aggravated felony to constitute a particularly 
                                                 
 5 The BIA had jurisdiction under 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1.  We have jurisdiction under 8 
U.S.C. § 1252(a)(1).  However, because Madrane is removable by reason of a criminal 
offense, our jurisdiction is limited to “constitutional claims or questions of law.”  8 
U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(C), (D).  Furthermore, we lack jurisdiction over discretionary relief 
such as the grant or denial of a waiver of inadmissibility under § 212(h), except insofar as 
it too raises a constitutional or legal issue.  8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(B), (D).  Because the 
BIA issued reasoned decisions on the merits, as opposed to summary affirmances of the 
IJ, we review the BIA’s decisions.  Bautista v. Att’y Gen., 744 F.3d 54, 57 (3d Cir. 
2014). 
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serious crime.  Alaka v. Att’y Gen., 456 F.3d 88, 105 (3d Cir. 2006).6   
Madrane’s argument that his crimes were not particularly serious rests solely on 
his claim that the BIA improperly classified them as aggravated felonies.  The INA 
defines the term “aggravated felony” to include “an offense that . . .  involves fraud or 
deceit in which the loss to the victim or victims exceeds $10,000.”  8 U.S.C. § 
1101(a)(43)(M)(i).  Madrane does not dispute that his crimes involved fraud or deceit, 
but argues that the Government failed to meet its burden of showing that his crime 
involved losses to the victims exceeding $10,000, even under the “circumstance-specific” 
approach of Nijhawan.7  557 U.S. at 36. 
The record clearly demonstrates that the losses incurred were significantly more 
than $10,000, and Madrane has not shown otherwise.  Among other things, the BIA 
properly considered the amount of restitution ordered as a measure of the victims’ losses.  
Restitution may establish loss for the purposes of § 1101(a)(43)(M)(i) where indicia of 
reliability are present, such as where a petitioner “fail[ed] to contest[ ] [it] during the 
                                                 
6 Aggravated felonies for which the term of imprisonment is less than five years 
are not automatically considered particularly serious, but may be designated so by an IJ 
upon consideration of “the nature of the conviction, the type of sentence imposed, and the 
circumstances and underlying facts of the conviction.”  In re N-A-M-, 24 I. & N. Dec. 
336, 342 (2007); see also Denis v. Att’y Gen., 633 F.3d 201, 214-16 (3d Cir. 2011) 
(citing N-A-M- and collecting other cases concerning the classification of particularly 
serious crimes).  
7 Nijhawan, 557 U.S. at 41-43, holds that when determining whether losses exceed 
$10,000 for the purpose of establishing removability, a court may go beyond the record 
of conviction that would ordinarily be consulted, such as the charging documents, jury 
instructions, plea agreement, and plea colloquy, and consider additional evidence such as 
sentencing information and the amount of restitution ordered. 
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criminal proceedings,” failed to show during removal proceedings that it was erroneously 
determined, or where it significantly exceeds the $10,000 threshold.  In re Babaisakov, 24 
I. & N. Dec. 306, 320 (2007).  Here, Madrane did not contest the restitution amount at 
sentencing, nor does he challenge his counsel’s representation that he personally used 
stolen credit card numbers to make purchases of between $8,000 and $12,000.8  AR 
1737.  Thus, the loss from his crimes exceeded $10,000 and the BIA therefore correctly 
concluded that Madrane’s conviction satisfied the aggravated felony requirement for a 
particularly serious crime, and his petition for review will be denied with respect to his 
claim for withholding of removal. 
B 
 Next, Madrane argues that the BIA erred by denying his claim for deferral of 
removal under the CAT, 8 C.F.R. § 1208.17(a).  Deferral of removal is available to aliens 
who are subject to mandatory denial of withholding but have otherwise satisfied the 
requirements for CAT protection by demonstrating that “it is more likely than not that he 
or she would be tortured if removed to the proposed country of removal.”  Toussaint v. 
Att’y Gen., 455 F.3d 409, 413 (3d Cir. 2006) (citation omitted); see also 8 C.F.R. 
§§ 208.16(c)(4), 1208.16(c)(4).  This torture must take place “by or at the instigation of 
or with the consent or acquiescence of a public official or other person acting in an 
                                                 
8 Madrane argues that his attorney “did object to the loss calculation,” citing a 
portion of the sentencing record in which Madrane could not agree with the Government 
on the intended loss from credit card numbers that were stolen but not fraudulently used.  
Pet’s Br. at 22.  There was no challenge to the amount of losses from fraudulent 
spending, which was the basis of the restitution award. 
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official capacity.”  8 C.F.R. §§ 208.18(a)(1), 1208.18(a)(1).  To constitute acquiescence, 
the government “need not [have] actual knowledge . . . of torturous conduct particular to 
the petitioner.”  Silva-Rengifo v. Att’y Gen., 473 F.3d 58, 64 (3d Cir. 2007).  Rather, a 
petitioner can satisfy his burden “by producing sufficient evidence that the government in 
question is willfully blind to such activities.”  Id. at 65. 
 Madrane attempts to cast his disagreement with the BIA as a question of law by 
arguing that the BIA “misconstrued” the legal standards that apply to requests for CAT 
relief.  See Pet.’s Br. at 31-32.  First, Madrane argues that the BIA incorrectly stated that 
the country conditions evidence was insufficient to show that Madrane was “personally at 
risk” of torture.  AR 5.  The BIA did not state as a matter of law that country conditions 
evidence can never in any case be sufficient to carry a petitioner’s burden.  Rather, it 
concluded that the type of general evidence of human rights violations presented in this 
case is insufficient to show that any one individual would be at risk, and that Madrane 
failed to present sufficient evidence to demonstrate that the Morrocan government would 
suspect him of involvement with the Muslim Brotherhood.  The BIA’s weighing of the 
evidence to conclude that it is unlikely that Madrane would be targeted, or that 
Madrane’s country conditions evidence is insufficient, is a factual determination beyond 
our jurisdiction to review.  Green v. Att’y Gen., 694 F.3d 503, 506 (3d Cir. 2012).  
 The same can be said of Madrane’s second argument, that the BIA “ignored the 
country conditions evidence indicating that the Islamist PJD [Party of Justice and 
Development,] which swept Morocco’s 2011 parliamentary election, is an affiliate of the 
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Muslim Brotherhood,” Pet.’s Br. at 34 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted),  
and thus erroneously failed to consider the Muslim Brotherhood to be “part of the 
government,” Pet.’s Br. at 35.  He contends that the BIA should have used the test set 
forth in Kamara v. Attorney General, in which we held that a petitioner’s likelihood of 
being tortured by two separate groups with government acquiescence should be added 
together to ascertain whether he is more likely than not to be tortured.  420 F.3d 202, 
213-14 (3d Cir. 2005).   
 In this case, Madrane’s argument is plainly an attack on the BIA’s underlying 
factual finding that he did not establish that the Moroccan government would acquiesce 
in torture by the Muslim Brotherhood.  We lack jurisdiction to review such fact finding 
and Madrane cannot obtain review of such factual determinations “simply by attaching a 
particular label to [his] claim.”  Cospito v. Att’y Gen., 539 F.3d 166, 170 (3d Cir. 2008) 
(citing Jarbough v. Att’y Gen., 483 F.3d 184, 189-90 (3d Cir. 2007)).  Consequently, 
Madrane’s petition for review of the denial of his CAT claim must be dismissed for lack 
of jurisdiction. 
C 
Finally, Madrane argues that the BIA erred in concluding that he committed an 
aggravated felony and that this error caused him to be erroneously denied a waiver under 
§ 212(h).  The Attorney General has the power to adjust aliens to lawful permanent 
resident status if they are admissible and an immigrant visa is immediately available to 
them.  8 U.S.C. § 1255(a).  There is no dispute that Madrane is inadmissible for a crime 
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involving moral turpitude.  8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(2)(A)(i).  In addition, as we just 
explained, the BIA did not err in finding he committed an aggravated felony.   
Section 212(h) allows inadmissibility to nonetheless be waived where denial of 
admission to the United States would “result in extreme hardship” to a citizen or 
permanent resident family member.  8 U.S.C. § 1182(h).  Here, the BIA evaluated 
Madrane’s request for a § 212(h) waiver on its merits and denied him a waiver as an 
exercise of its discretion.  We lack jurisdiction to review this discretionary decision.  See 
8 U.S.C. §§ 1182(h), 1252(a)(2)(B).  Thus, Madrane’s claim that the BIA erred in failing 
to allow him to adjust status must be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. 
III 
 For the foregoing reasons, we will deny the petition with respect to Madrane’s 
withholding of removal claim, and dismiss the petition with respect to his CAT claim and 
request to adjust his status.  
